Issue Brief: U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Cooperation

| U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Cooperation: Rebuilding Equality, Mutual Benefit, and Respect

Nuclear security cooperation is not something countries do as a favor to each other. It is in the interests of all countries to ensure that nuclear material does not end up in the hands of terrorists. Moreover, neither nuclear security, nor international cooperation, can simply be turned on and off like a light switch. Both effective and sustainable nuclear security and international cooperation require continuous attention and improvement

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Abstract

This Issue Brief will describe how the United States and Russia arrived at this point. It will highlight differences in how the United States
and Russia approach nuclear security. It will identify what limited nuclear security related work will likely continue between the two coun-
tries in the future. Finally, it will identify potential opportunities for future cooperation related to nuclear security between the United States
and Russia.

Policy recommendations

  • The prospects for rebuilding nuclear security cooperation will be at least somewhat better if this work is part of a broader set of cooperative efforts between the two countries where there is an established consensus on mutual benefit, including work on environmental remediation and advancing the frontiers of science and engineering. As a first step, technical and scientific cooperation between the two countries should be reestablished. There are a broad range of areas in which scientists in both countries can cooperate. The U.S. Department of Energy should allow Russian scientists to conduct research in the United States and vice versa. Technical experts in both countries should identify areas where joint research could be conducted.

  • The United States and Russia should expand cooperative work to address nuclear terrorism in third countries. This includes continuing repatriation of nuclear weapons-useable material in third countries. It also includes strengthening nuclear safety and security in states with both established and burgeoning civilian and military nuclear programs; training specialists on export controls; improving detection of nuclear smuggling; sharing intelligence; and assessing and modeling nuclear terrorism threats.

  • The United States should reestablish – as equal partners – a dialogue with Russia about its nuclear security on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and respect. To be successful, there must be joint ownership in both countries of the cooperative relationship. This should include frequent workshops to exchange ideas and best practices; reciprocal visits to key facilities in each country to demonstrate different approaches to security; support for the installation of equipment that both parties agree is needed; joint work on strengthening material protection control and accounting practices and technologies; expanded training of nuclear security personnel; and sharing reports and briefings regarding terrorist threats, which can help reduce complacency.

  • Both the United States and Russia should utilize international fora to continue dialogue on nuclear security. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism would be a logical place for such a dialogue to take place. Additionally, the ongoing “P5 Process”, involving the five officially recognized nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), would be another possible forum for discussion of military materials. The P5 could have the added value of bringing additional countries with nuclear weapons and material other than the United States and Russia into discussions about how to improve nuclear security.

  • Russia and the United States should make a commitment to protecting all of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear material against the full range of plausible outsider and insider threats, outlining steps to achieve that goal, paving the road for other countries to travel.

  • Russia and the United States should establish jointly-sponsored Centers for Nuclear Security in Russia and the United States where U.S. and Russians could work together on nuclear security and material accounting. The center could assess nuclear security challenges in countries around the world and identify and propose steps to mitigating those challenges. This cooperation should include frequent workshops to exchange ideas and best practices; reciprocal visits to key facilities in each country to demonstrate different approaches to security; support for the installation of equipment that both parties agree is needed; joint work on strengthening material protection control and accounting practices and technologies; and expanded training of nuclear security personnel. Above all, equality and mutual ownership must be integral features of the cooperative relationship

Authors

  • Andrei Zagorski

    Andrei Zagorski is Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Center for International Security at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), where he served as Vice-Rector (1992-1999).